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James

Many

J.

Hilton

of Americas public education system hail parental or school choice, a
program that allows public school systems to compete against one another and, uncritics

der some proposals, against private educational
tional funding, as the

answer

to

institutions,

Americas educational

for students and educa-

crisis.

Proponents argue that

competition will force public schools to offer students a quality education or close.
This article does not evaluate the claims of the parental-choice proposals; rather,

examines the

difficulties inherent in

it

funding such a system through traditional school

finance mechanisms.

Allowing

— which
U.S. education —

parents to determine where their children will attend school

some believe can

1

contribute to the solution of the crisis in

undermines local control of a school system. States traditionally pay for public
schools through local property taxes. 2 While detractors criticize the property tax for

generating inequities in the distribution of education dollars, 3 supporters claim that
the benefits of local control over education

outweigh

its

inequities.

4

A parental-

choice program, however, vests control over education not with any particular locality,

but with an individual. Without local control,

it

becomes

difficult to justify

traditional educational financing.

The

rationalization for parental-choice

nisms established

programs also clashes with funding mecha-

to secure educational equity.

The highest courts of

several states

5

have deemed traditional financing mechanisms unconstitutional, holding that the
right to educational equity

outweighs the benefits of local control. 6 Under a choice

program, competition provides the incentive for school
this necessarily implies that

which recognize
at

some school

districts to

districts will fare better

a right to educational equity

improve. Because

than others, states

must be concerned with the education

those schools which fare poorly under such a program.

This article examines the parental-choice program as enacted in Massachusetts.
It

next turns to court decisions citing local control over educational systems as the
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justification for a state's educational funding

undermines local control over education.

It

system and shows that parental choice

then examines the right to educational

equity found in several state constitutions and the effect a choice program will have

on educational

equity. Finally,

it

concludes that legislatures should be wary of enact-

ing school-choice programs without corresponding reform in educational financing.

School Choice

I.

The term "school choice" encompasses a broad range of programs, including (1) interdistrict choice programs, which allow a student to attend any school within the
7
student's community, (2) voucher programs, in which the government provides a
student with an educational voucher that the student may redeem at any public or
8
private school at the government's expense, and (3) specialty schools, where students attend a particular institution in the school district in order to specialize in
fine arts, languages,
I

and so

forth.

9

Rather than discuss theoretical reform proposals,

discuss school choice as adopted in Massachusetts.

differs slightly

from each of

these, but

most closely resembles a voucher program.

The commonwealth's program allows any student
the youngster's

own

The place where

district at the

the student attends school
this type

expense of the

the student resides
is

of choice program,

Massachusetts program

is

to attend a public school outside

termed the "sending"
district.

including Massachusetts.

in the spring

which the student

district in

termed the "receiving"
11

The Massachusetts program

of 1991; the

first

12

district; the

lives.

10

place where

Presently ten states allow

The

legislature enacted the

students participated in the

program during the 1991-1992 school year.
Massachusetts's school-choice program is rooted in Milton Friedman's Capitalism
and Freedom, 13 in which Friedman argues that government-sponsored schools should
be allowed to compete with private schools for education dollars. Currently, private
and public schools can compete only on a limited basis. Parents who choose to send
their children to private school must bear the cost of their child's education in addition to paying taxes that finance the public schools. Friedman proposes a system under which every child would receive a voucher redeemable for an education at any
14
institution the government approves.
Schools would compete for students. Parents
would choose only the best schools for their children, encouraging schools to provide
better education. Parents who wish to provide more education for their children than
the voucher buys might supplement it with additional funds.
Members of the Republican Party, especially Ronald Reagan and George Bush,
have expounded on the virtues of school choice. When Bush announced his intention
to be remembered as the "education president," he made school choice a central
focus of his plan. 15

Under

may choose

the Massachusetts school-choice program, any student

home district
may vote not to

his or her

to attend public school in another district.

district

accept students under the program,

its

students within the district.

how many
in

students

it

16

Once

will accept,

it

it

to leave

Although a school

cannot vote to keep

chooses to participate, a

based on available space, but

district

may

may

all

decide

not discriminate

admissions. This prohibition extends to discrimination based on race, color, relig-

ious creed, national origin, sex, age, ancestry, athletic performance, physical handicap, special need or academic performance, or proficiency in the English language.
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17

When
trict

a child chooses to attend school outside the

becomes responsible

home

district, the

for paying tuition to the receiving district.

charge equals the average per pupil expenditure

at the

18

sending dis-

The

tuition

receiving district. 19 Because

students do not leave high-spending districts to attend classes in low-spending districts,

20

more

the sending school pays

to the receiving district than the receiving dis-

would have spent had the child stayed in the home district. Some of the
problems resulting from this financing mechanism are explored further below. 21
Normally, a school district must provide transportation to all students residing
more than two miles from school. 22 Students participating in the school choice program are responsible for their own transportation to the receiving district school. 23
trict

II.

Local Control as Justification for Educational Funding Systems

That parental choice undercuts local control over the educational system does not

mean

that such parental choice plans contain flaws.

relative virtues of local control

Educators must debate the

and parental choice. Rather, local control serves as

the justification for present educational funding

mechanisms.

If

one removed local

control as a justification, one should also reconsider the funding mechanism.

The Supreme Court,

in

San Antonio School District

v.

Rodriguez, 24 explains

local control justifies using local property taxes to finance public education.
plaintiffs in

25

how

The

Rodriguez challenge Texas's educational funding system under the equal

protection clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment

to the federal Constitution. Plaintiffs

claimed that funding the school system through a tax on property created disparities

between school

districts and,

which the Constitution

consequently, deprived them of an equal education, to

entitled them.

The Supreme Court began
would not be subject to strict

its

analysis by deciding that the Texas financing system

scrutiny.

26

Under

a "strict scrutiny" test, the Court in-

validates a statute unless a state demonstrates a compelling interest in retaining the
statute as written.

27

Traditionally, the Court reviews a state's laws strictly

when

those

laws prejudice those "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to

process."

28

command

extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political

The Court held

that those living in districts without a large property-tax

base constituted too "large, diverse, and amorphous" a class to be the object of judicial protection.

29

Strictly judicial scrutiny applies not only to

laws infringing on certain groups,

but also on laws infringing on certain fundamental rights. 30 Plaintiffs also contended
that education, like voting, travel,

and other rights guaranteed

in the Constitution,

established a fundamental right. Because the Texas system of financing education

detracted from their ability to receive a quality education,
strict scrutiny.

tant,

The Court

it

should be subject to

also rejected this argument, holding that although impor-

education did not rise to the level of a fundamental right under the federal Con-

stitution.

Such

status

remained reserved for those rights expressly protected within

the Constitution itself. 31

Concluding
strict

that the

Texas school-financing system should not be subjected

to

or heightened scrutiny, the Court then proceeded to analyze the Texas statute

under traditional equal protection doctrine, which requires only that the statute be
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rationally related to a legitimate state purpose to be valid.

system constituted a valid

local control of the educational

Texas funding system related rationally

to this purpose.

found the Texas system of financing constitutional.

32

The Court found

state

For

that

purpose and that the

this reason, the

Court

33

State courts also endorse local control over education as a legitimate justification

and towns

for allowing cities

to raise revenues at the local level.

34

Different courts

recognize different aspects of local control as legitimate, including: local control over
educational content; 35 local control over educational spending; 36 and local control

over municipal spending

37

priorities.

Courts acknowledge that students living in different communities possess varying

The

educational needs.

residents of a particular municipality, rather than a state, are

better able to shape a school's curricula to

community

that they are well

way

about the

feel strongly

managed. One court

its

students' needs. Parents living within a

their local schools are run
stated:

Traditionally, not only in Idaho but throughout

most of the

the legislature has left the establishment, control and

community which

the parents and taxpayers in the

ganized the school

district

and thus ensure

states

of the Union,

management of the school
The local residents

to

serves.

it

or-

pursuant to enabling legislation, imposed taxes upon

own school house, elected their own trustees and through
own school. It was under these circumstances that the "Little

themselves, built their

them managed their
Red School House" became an American conception of freedom in education, and
in local control of institutions of local concern. In the American concept, there is
no greater right
parent. In

to the supervision of the education of the child than that of the

no other hands could

The American people made

it

be

safer.

a wise choice early in their history

ating a forty-eight-state system of education, but also

by not only

cre-

by retaining within the com-

munity control of the educational program. This tradition of community
administration

is

a firmly accepted and deeply rooted policy.

Another legitimate reason for local control over education
can, for themselves, decide

how

is

that cities

to balance educational expenditures against expendi-

tures for other public services. Local control allows individual cities

may

place heavy emphasis on schools, while others

improved

and towns

desire greater police or fire pro-

streets or public transportation."

39

These communities are

lowed to reflect these decisions by determining how much of
on education.

their tax dollar to

Finally, local control of education also allows a municipality to determine at
level

it

chooses to tax

nicipality values

its

may

decide that

ing on services.

tial

money

it

is

State, voters,

by

their action

states:

on school budgets, exercise a substan-

control over the educational opportunities

which

will

what

which public services a muand other services allows a
values public services enough to tax its residents.
better left in individual hands, with minimal spend-

made

available in their districts; to

the extent that an authorized budget requires expenditures in excess of State aid,

tem of

spend

local control of education

The New York Court of Appeals

Throughout the

al-

residents. Similar to choosing

most highly,

municipality to decide whether

Locals

to de-

"Some communities might

termine on which services local tax dollars are spent.

tection, or

and towns

be funded by local taxes, there

local school financing

is

a direct correlation

between the sys-

and implementation of the desires of the taxpayer.
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States justify the use of educational funding

means of providing

in local districts as a

mechanisms

that create disparities

local control over local schools.

courts have upheld these funding systems, declaring

them

Many

rationally related to legiti-

mate legislative ends. 41 The school-choice program, however, undercuts the locality's
control over educational content, over educational spending, and over its tax dollars.
behind allowing a school finance system that generates education

If the rationale

resides in local control over education, one cannot simultaneously rationalize a

school-choice program which forces municipalities to surrender funds to neigh-

boring school

Under

districts.

the Massachusetts school-choice program, school districts

may

vote to

"every child in

The right to leave a local school district to attend
however, does not depend on the school district, but belongs to
42
the Commonwealth."
A locality may not vote to keep all its stu-

dents within

schools. Although

accept students into

another school,

its

its

schools.

it

may choose

not to participate in the school-

choice program by admitting students, a school district
that

it

must allow

participate to the extent

43
students to attend classes in other districts.

its

The philosophy behind

this

program

of local control outlined above.
student's education.

may

While

directly contradicts each of the versions

First, localities lose control

over the content of a

local control of a school system allows a municipality to

determine the content of a student's education, the municipality loses

soon as a student leaves
school

its

school

district, that district's

district.

Once

this ability as

a child chooses to attend another

school committee takes charge of the curriculum,

graduation requirements, and so on. 44 Although parents gain control over the content of their child's education, in that they determine

where

their child will attend

school, parental control over education does not justify a system of local financing

of education.

Second, localities lose control over the cost of a child's education. Because of the

must pay the
the receiving school. 45 Because

structure of the Massachusetts school-choice program, a sending district

receiving district the cost of educating the student in

students do not leave high-spending schools to attend lower-spending schools, 46 this

means

that the sending school district has to

otherwise choose to do. This comes
ity

at the

spend more on education than

it

would

expense of other public services the local-

has chosen to maintain. 47
Finally, the sending school district, if a significant percentage of

choose to leave

its

system, loses control over

its

its

students

taxing decisions. To the extent that

the receiving school district's tuition rate exceeds that of the sending school, the send-

ing district

forced to raise

is

its

taxes to

spending and that of the receiving
probably

will,

choose

make up any difference between its level of
48
Of course, the sending school could, and

district.

to take these

funds from the existing school budget, decreasing

the funds available to everyone else. This action has a

comparable

effect.

Rather than

choosing to increase taxes to maintain the same level of services, the community has
simply chosen to maintain the same tax burden and decrease services. In either case,
the taxpayers lose control over the level of services they choose to provide.

These

taxpayers, then, have no control over the school budget for which they are paying.

One must bear
this analysis.

because
state

it

The

in

mind why

the issue of local control of education

state constitution

is

central to

does not condemn the school-choice program

constrains local control of education.

with responsibility for education.

49

The
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school districts under
stitution.

its

direct control without violating the

mandates of the con-

Local control, rather, figures centrally in justifying the present financing

mechanism

for education.

50

The

legislative goal of providing local control of educa-

tion justifies a funding system that generates disparities throughout the state.

The

school-choice program, however, severely undermines the legislative purpose of local
control of education.

Under

the program, a municipality

may

lose control of the

content of a student's education, of the funding of a student's education, and of

own

its

tax rate.

Because
itself

it

advocates local control of education, the legislature need not remove

completely from the educational sphere. Legislative pronouncements on school

curriculum, mandatory attendance, the length of the school day and school year, are
all

whose purpose is to provide local control of education. 51
regulations detract from local control, they are of a qualitatively

valid under a system

Although these

different nature than the school-choice program.
First, legislative regulations are the

product of legislative debate. All localities

participate, through their representatives, in the state's legislature

and have equal

opportunity to participate in the formation of these rules. Under the school-choice

program, the decision as to
sending

district, as

of another

district,

how

school dollars are spent no longer rests with the

confined by legislative pronouncements;

whose actions

Second, legislative regulation

it

becomes

the decision

are completely independent of the sending district.
is

a limiting factor

on

local control of education.

School choice fundamentally contradicts the notion of local control of education.
Legislative regulation sets boundaries within which a municipality

may

act as

it

deems appropriate. Under
school choice, the boundaries are reversed; the choice program mandates that a
locality shall have no voice over any aspect of some (or all) of its residents, even

chooses, providing the level and type of education

it

though the locality pays for their education.

III.

School Choice and Educational Equity

Not only those

states

which have upheld

local funding as a constitutional

method of

financing education, but also those which have rejected the traditional school-funding

system must consider the implications of adopting a choice program. The program

works well only

if

school districts compete against one another for students and

funding. Absent any differences

edging that differences

exist,

among

however,

schools, there

is

no competition. Acknowl-

may be an admission

that

because the quality

of a student's education depends on where he or she attends school, the system violates a student's rights to educational equity.

State courts

have overturned educational funding systems both because the fund-

ing system conflicted with the equal protection clause of the state constitution 52

and because the funding system violated the right

to an education

guaranteed by the

54

53

In Serrano v. Priest,
the California Supreme Court found that
method of funding education violated the state's equal protection clause.
Unlike the Supreme Court decision in Rodriguez, the California court found that
students living in property-poor school districts constituted a suspect class. Because
state constitution.

the state's

the financing system burdened this class, the court subjected
the system to be constitutional,

it

needed

to fulfill a

298

it

compelling

to strict scrutiny.
state purpose.

For

The court found
55

state purpose.

that local control of education did not constitute a

As

compelling

structured, the system actually frustrated the objective of pro-

56
While
viding individual cities and towns control over their educational systems.

property-rich districts could afford to provide the quality of education they chose,

property-poor districts did not enjoy the same options. Unlike rich

were confined

districts

amount of money they would

in the

districts,

poor

raise for education.

funding system, according to the California court, did not allow individual

The

districts

to control education.

Other

states, rather

than finding that students in property-poor districts con-

stituted a suspect class, subjected school-financing

laws to

strict

scrutiny because

they infringed upon a fundamental right to education guaranteed by their state's constitution.

57

When

subjected to

strict scrutiny, state

interest in a local school-financing system.
relies

on the

state's

The

courts found no compelling state

result in

such a case, where a court

equal protection clause in conjunction with a constitutional educa-

tion clause to overturn a school financing system, differs

from the

result in a case

where a court overturns a funding system based only on the state's equal protection
clause. While a court protects a student's right to an equal education when acting
under an equal protection clause alone, a court protects a student's right to a thorough and efficient education only when protecting a fundamental right.
This distinction becomes significant when discussing a school-choice program.
must compete against one another for
students and dollars. Because school funding will follow students from district to
district, those schools which attract more students will have more money to spend

For such a program

to succeed, schools

than those which attract fewer students. While this
favor,

may

it

is

the result choice proponents

violate a student's right to an equal education. In those states

By

guarantee each student an equal education, this system cannot succeed.
a system that

works only

if

which
creating

schools differ in quality, a legislature acknowledges that

some children will not receive as good an education as some others.
Most states, however, do not recognize a student's right to an equal education, but
only to a certain base level of education. While moving money from one district to
another

may

vary the quality of education an individual receives

at a school, in

to violate a state constitution the degradation in the student's education
to

be so great that

it

fails to

One might respond

meet the minimal constitutional

that although students

may be

order

would have

criteria.

guaranteed a quality education

over the course of twelve years in a school system, they are not guaranteed that in

any one particular year they will receive an education comparable

to that

which they

might have received had they chosen to attend another school. Because they can

change schools

if

an education

protected. This

While
ket

is

is

in the short

they are dissatisfied with the education they receive, their right to

run a system

fits

nicely with the economists' view of competition.

may

generate inefficiencies, in the long run the mar-

efficient.

These short-run problems

are,

however, quite significant.

for twelve years. If that child fails to learn
will not necessarily be able to learn

school one year, there
the

first.

In fact,

it is

is

how

no guarantee

how

is

in school only

in the second. If a student

chose a bad

that his or her next choice will be better than

likely that if a child

and her or his parents cared

about the education to pick a bad school in the

make another bad choice

A child

to read in the first grade, he or she

first

enough

place, together they will either

or choose to stay with the bad school.
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While in either case a legislature must consider the impact of adopting a schoolchoice program in the educational financing system, the chances of creating an unconstitutional system are far greater where a constitution guarantees educational
equality than where it simply guarantees a base level of education. These problems
will not resolve themselves through "competition," as school-choice advocates hope.

The education market differs from the "free" market in many ways.
Milton Friedman developed the "market rationale" behind the school-choice movement early in the 1960s. 58 The school-choice program, advocates contend, will foster
competition between school

Schools unable to

districts.

attract students will not

receive public funds, which will force them to improve their programs.

more

prove, they will attract

Advocates contend

students.

As

they im-

59

programs

that schools with inferior educational

will lose

means that schools
which begin with less money will lose money to schools which began in a relatively
stronger position. Although this will generate incentive for the weaker schools to
improve their programs, they will be left without the means to accomplish their end.
Poorer schools will attempt to enrich their educational programs at the same time
students to schools with superior educational programs. This

Faced with a similar

as they are losing funds to their competitors.

ness might choose one of several options.

and radically

alter the

way

which

in

it

It

might decide

situation, a busi-

new

to invest

capital

does business. With new capital or a new

marketing plan, the business, better able to compete, will win back customers and

A public

stay in the market.

borrow funds

to

pay short-term expenses. 60

Simply amending the law
this

problem.

school, of course, cannot do this. Municipalities cannot

to

allow municipalities to borrow funds will not solve

A private company
The consumer

sible for its debts.

that attempts a

loses nothing. This

a school district borrows funds to improve
to attract students,

it

comeback

its

— and

fails

cannot simply go bankrupt.

is

respon-

not true of a city or town. If

is

educational program and
61

—

The town

is still

is still

unable

responsible for

the debt of the school district.

School

another problem that businesses in the free market will never

districts face

encounter. If a businessman produces a mediocre article at low cost and a competitor

produces a better version
the customer's purchase

customers' trade, he
product. But that

is

is

at a

higher cost, the

first

businessman never has

to

pay for

from the competitor. Although the businessman may lose

not required to ensure that customers acquire the competitor's

exactly what sending school districts must do. If a student

chooses to leave a school

district, that district

must pay

for that student to attend a

school elsewhere. Unlike most goods sold on the market, the consumer in this situation has a protected right to receive quality merchandise, and the
the responsibility to ensure that the

Once

it

extinction.

consumer receives

begins to lose students, a school starts
It

will lose funds. Its

programs

this

down

will suffer

government has

"merchandise."

the slippery slope toward

and

it

will lose

more

students,

One would expect the cycle to end with all the students leaving. But this will not happen. Some children will continue to attend their
community schools, no matter how bad they become. This might be because they
leading to a larger loss of funds.

cannot afford transportation to a neighboring school
their parents care

other, or simply
will suffer

enough about

district,

because neither they nor

their education to leave their school district for an-

because the local school

is

convenient. These are the students

under the choice program.

300

who

Proponents argue that the effects on poorer school

districts will not

Although schools are losing money, they are also losing students. The

be

this drastic.

district is left

with unchanged average expenditures.

argument. The

which concerns the
structure of the Massachusetts program, could be solved. Sending school districts
are forced to pay receiving school districts the latter's average per pupil cost. This
means that sending districts will usually lose more than their average per pupil
There are several problems with

when

cost

a student leaves

this

first,

school. Therefore the average per pupil cost for the

its

remaining students will decrease.

Much more

however, are the effects of marginal

difficult to correct,

receiving school adds one pupil to

its

enrollment

lists, its

costs

cost.

When

a

do not increase by the

The receiving school already has a building, a school superschool principal, and may even have, if few enough students enroll
choice program, sufficient teachers to educate more students. When a

per pupil average cost.
intendent, a

through the

student leaves a sending school, however,

of educating that student.

It

must continue

does not save the per pupil average cost

it

to

employ

a superintendent, heat the build-

enough students leave, it may be able to reduce its teaching costs. 62
This means that schools which receive students under the choice program can use
the extra tuition funds to expand offerings to all their students. Such offerings make
a school even more appealing, allowing it to attract more students. The sending
school, however, will be forced to eliminate programs for all its students, making
ing,

it

and so on.

less attractive for those

money
to

If

who

remain.

One

school superintendent noted that the

his school sent to another school district

under the choice program was used

fund foreign language classes and a lacrosse team;

was forced

to eliminate its foreign

language classes.

at the

same

time, his school

63

ways to improve the quality of education students receive, they must bear in mind the constitutional implications of their actions. While
a school-choice program may provide one method of heightening educational quality,
While

legislatures search for

through competition for students and educational dollars, such a program, unless ac-

companied by a corresponding reform

in traditional

methods of school funding, may

run counter to existing constitutional decisions.

Applying

free

market rationale

to distribute scarce resources

Competition between businesses ensures that prices remain
that the

can be quite

efficient.

at a tolerable level

and

market provides quality goods. Education, however, should not be considered

a scarce resource. State constitutions guarantee each child a basic level of education

and vest the responsibility for providing
latures

must not abandon

This article

was

education in state legislatures. The legis-

their responsibility to the

whim

of the market.

**-

written prior to the passage of the Massachusetts Education

Reform Act of 1993. However nothing
author's argument.
In

this

March 1994,

in the nation's

in the

act invalidates or contradicts the

most dramatic

shift in

a century

in the

way public

schools are financed, Michigan voters approved a plan to use sales and other taxes,
not property taxes, to pay for

its

3,286 schools.

All told, twenty-eight states are in state courts over the

education. In most cases, civil rights groups
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and

way

they finance public

coalitions of parents have alleged

New England Journal

of Public Policy

that state aid to supplement property taxes does not close the

gap between

rich

schools and poor ones.
In the case of Michigan, the consequences of

ards and performance will take some time to

on educational standbe evaluated. Meantime, the debate
its initiative

goes on.
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